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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND COMPELLED TESTIMONY:
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN THE WAKE
OF KASTIGAR
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great land-
marks in man's struggle to make himself civilized .... [W]e do not
make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant,
or dig his own grave, or pull the lever that springs the trap on which
he stands. We have through the course of history developed a con-
siderable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the in-
dividual man. Even the evil man is a human being.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The right 2 of the individual to be free from the compulsion to act as
his own accuser must be preserved in a viable free culture, lest a depriva-
tion of this inherent right lead to a gradual, inevitable erosion of the
dignity of man. However, it is evident that the interest of society in order
and self-preservation demands an accommodation with this individual
right. It is in the attempt to rationally accommodate these potentially
conflicting interests that the dignity of the individual is threatened. Any
civilized society must insure that the balance is struck in favor of pre-
serving the "intrinsic importance" of man.
Immunity statutes represent an effort to achieve such a balance. They
are designed to procure the benefits of an individual's knowledge for
society while preserving the individual's constitutional right not to accuse
himself. The Supreme Court recently held in Kastigar v. United States3
that this accommodation may be constitutionally achieved by a federal
statute which, although compelling a witness to testify over his objection
that the desired testimony would be self-incriminating, guarantees that
nothing he says nor anything derived therefrom can be used against him
in a subsequent criminal prosecution.4 While some commentators have
criticized this approval of such "use/derivative use" immunity as failing
to protect either the individual or the collective right,5 such criticism is
beyond the scope of this Comment. The focus here shall be upon the
practical difficulties remaining in the application of such statutes. Conse-
quently, the analysis of this Comment shall be directed toward the resolu-
tion of two basic problems. First, attention shall be centered upon the
problems confronting a defendant in a subsequent prosecution, when he
1. E. GRISWOLD, THE FiFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
2. It should be noted at the outset that the words "right" and "privilege" are
used interchangeably throughout this Comment in the discussion of the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination. No distinction is thereby intended.
3. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
4. Id. at 453.
5. See, e.g., Note, Immunity and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2 AM. J. CRiM.
L. 29 (1973); Note, Kastigar v. United States: Compulsory Witness Immunity and
the Fifth Amendment, 6 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & P. 120 (1972); Note, The Scope
of Testimonial Immunity Under the Fifth Amendment: Kastigar v. United States,
6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 350 (1973).
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has been compelled to give incriminating testimony during a prior pro-
ceeding under a grant of "use/derivative use" immunity. Second, con-
sideration will be given to those circumstances under which a witness
may refuse to testify in the first instance, even though afforded a grant
of such immunity.
II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Conflict: The Individual vs. The Collective Right
The privilege of the individual to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination originated in the early English common law as a response
to the unfettered ability of English judicial officers to place a witness
under oath and conduct broad inquiries into possible criminal activity. 6
Development of the privilege was spurred by the Trial of Lilburn,7
where public outrage at the defendant's whipping upon his refusal to
answer incriminating questions before the Star Chamber led Parliament
to abandon both the Star Chamber and the oath which imposed upon
the defendant the duty to testify." The effort to protect the individual
from such inquisitions gradually led to the development of a privilege
of silence, and by the end of the seventeenth century it was established
in England that "no man is bound to answer any questions that will sub-
ject him to a penalty, or to infamy." This common law privilege developed
gradually in the colonies until it was found, in one form or another, in the
constitution or bill of rights of seven of the American states.' 0 Elevation
of the privilege to constitutional status was an effort to guarantee the
protection of this fundamental liberty in the face of its blatant violation
by the colonial governors." This early development climaxed in 1791
with the adoption of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, which provides that "no person . . .shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself .... -12
6. See Note, Witness Immunity Statutes: The Constitutional and Functional
Sufficiency of "Use Immunity," 51 B.U.L. REV. 616, 617 (1971).
7. 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637).
8. See Note, supra note 6, at 617.
9. Trial of Freind, 13 How. St. Tr. 1, 17 (1696).
10. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self -Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1935). Other authorities
providing a more detailed historical development of the privilege are E. GRIswoLD,
supra note 1; L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIRTH AMENDMENT (1968); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949).
11. Pittman, supra note 10, at 786-87.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Throughout years of judicial construction this simple
phrase has been explained, expanded, and limited. It is a narrower than the common
law privilege to refuse to answer questions subjecting one to a penalty or infamy,
for it has long been established that the invocation of the privilege is limited to those
situations in which an answer would subject a witness to a possible criminal penalty.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-67 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605-06(1896) ; Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Tread-
ing the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1583 (1963). The assertion of
the privilege will be sustained as long as there exists a reasonable possibility that a
COMMENTS
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The common law of England, the source of this individual right,
also provided for the conflicting right of compulsory testimony. In order
for the common law adversary system to effectively serve as a truth-
finding process, the relevant and reliable testimony of all witnesses was
required. The power of the government to compel testimony was recog-
nized in the early English statutes, 13 and, in 1612, in the Countess of
Shrewsbury's Case,14 Lord Bacon stated that "all subjects, without dis-
tinction of degrees, owe to the King tribute and service, not only of their
deed and hand, but of their knowledge and discovery."'u
This ability of the government to compel testimony was recognized
constitutionally in this country to the extent that the sixth amendment
provides that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to
confront those witnesses who testify against him as well as the right to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his behalf. 16 This collec-
tive right was legislatively recognized in the Judiciary Act of 178917 which
provided for compulsory attendance of witnesses in federal courts.' 8 The
necessity for such compulsion is obvious. Without it, the courts, having the
ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of social order, would be unable
to adequately function.' For this very reason the Supreme Court has
frequently and recently recognized the legitimacy of this state power.2 0
Immunity statutes represent a governmental attempt to resolve the
conflict between these two interests when the necessary testimony is with-
held by the witness pursuant to his constitutional right not to incriminate
himself. Congress first provided for such immunity in 1857 with the
passage of the Compulsory Testimony Act 2' which provided absolute
responsive answer will subject the witness to a possible criminal penalty. Zicarelli v.
New Jersey Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478-81 (1972) ; Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 143-44
(1913) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896). Furthermore, the privilege
may be invoked in any proceeding. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94
(1964) (White, J., concurring); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924);
United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100, 104 (1828). The privilege, how-
ever, is strictly personal, protecting the witness from incriminating himself only.
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
69-70 (1906).
13. See, e.g., 5 Eliz. 1, c. 9, § 12 (1562), which provided for the imposition of a
penalty and granted a civil right action against any person who refused to appear as
a witness after service of process and tender of expenses. Historical treatments of
testimonial compulsion are found in L. LEVY, supra note 10; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 10, §§ 2190-93.
14. 2 How. St. Tr. 769 (1612).
15. Id. at 778.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor ....
17. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 88-89.
18. Id. § 30.
19. See Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony,
39 HARV. L. REV. 694, 695 (1926).
20. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972); Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
21. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, §§ 1-3, 11 Stat. 155-56.
[VOL. 19
3
Harding: The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony: Practical Problems i
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
FEBRUARY 1974]
immunity from prosecution for "any fact or act" communicated by the
witness in compelled testimony before either House of Congress or a
committee thereof.2 2 This immunity grant proved to be overbroad in
practice, leading to the so-called "immunity bath," for all a witness had
to do in order to receive protection was volunteer information which
criminally implicated him.23 Consequently, Congress narrowed the scope
of protection afforded the witness in the passage of the Compulsory
Testimony Act of 1862,24 which provided that "[t]he testimony of a
witness . ..before either House of Congress . .. shall not be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding ....
B. The Supreme Court Treatment
It was the incorporation in the Interstate Commerce Act of 188726
of a provision similar to that included in the Compulsory Testimony Act
of 1862 which led to the eventual consideration of "use" immunity by
the Supreme Court. The complexities of economic regulation in the area
of interstate commerce and the necessary reliance upon information fur-
nished by witnesses had created the need for an immunity grant.2 7 The
Interstate Commerce Commission began employing the provision without
hesitation, and witnesses before it correspondingly asserted their fifth
amendment privilege in the face of the immunity grant.2 8
Confronted with such a situation in Counselman v. Hitchcock,2 9
the Court, in 1892, found mere "use" immunity constitutionally deficient,
indicating that any legislation seeking to replace the privilege must be at
least as broad in scope and effect as the privilege itself.3 0  Clearly, pro-
tection coextensive with the right was not provided in the statute. As
the Court noted:
22. Id. § 2
23. Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 447, 450-54 (1954). See also Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and
the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST.
Louis L.J. 327, 333-35 (1966).
24. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333.
25. Id. (emphasis added). In 1868 this narrower "use" immunity was also
made available in any judicial proceeding. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
26. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, §§ 11-12, 24 Stat. 383. Apparently, prior to
the adoption of this provision the power to compel testimony possessed by Congress
and the courts was not employed to any great extent. However, the ability to compel
testimony under a grant of "use" immunity had been sustained by lower federal courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1273 (No. 14,671) (D.C.D. Ore. 1871);
In re Phillips, 19 F. Cas. 506 (No. 11,097) (D.C.D. Va. 1869).
27. See Note, supra note 12, at 1573.
28. Wendel, supra note 23, at 338.
29. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
30. Id. at 586. It should be noted that prior to Counselman, several state courts
had sustained the constitutionality of such "use" immunity. See, e.g., State v. Quarles,
13 Ark. 307 (1853); Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184 (1857); Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga.
255 (1853) ; Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153 (1860); People ex rel. Hackley v.
Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74 (1871). Contra, Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871); State v.
Nowell, 58 N.H. 314 (1878); Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 624 (1873).
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[The statute] affords no protection against that use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the
details of a crime, and of sources of information which may supply
other means of convicting the witness or party.3 '
However, the most significant portion of the Counselman opinion was
dictum to the effect that any immunity statute, in order to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, must provide "absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the question relates. ' 3 2
Congress immediately reacted to this invalidation of "use" immunity
with the passage of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 33 which
granted the witness immunity from future prosecution "for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify .... 34
This Act, although limited in application to evidence presented before the
Interstate Commerce Commission or to proceedings brought under the
Interstate Commerce Act,35 was specifically designed to satisfy the "abso-
lute immunity" requirement proclaimed in the Counselman dictum.3,6 In
1896, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of this "transactional" im-
munity in Brown v. Walker,37 wherein it was plainly indicated that such
immunity fulfilled the coextensiveness requirement of Counselman in
effectively and fully supplanting the fifth amendment right.38 It became
essentially settled after Brown that transactional immunity, prohibiting
future prosecution of the immunized witness in relation to the matter for
which immunity was granted, was constitutionally justifiable. 39 In fact,
the immunity statute sustained in Brown became the basic model for
numerous federal immunity statutes subsequently enacted by Congress.4"
New questions arose in 1964, however, when the Supreme Court held
for the first time that the fourteenth amendment constitutionally required
31. 142 U.S. at 586.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. Counselman was decided on
January 11, 1892, and the new immunity bill which was the basis for this Act was
introduced on January 27, 1892. 23 CONG. REC. 573 (1892).
34. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443-44.
35. After the Counselman Court's invalidation of the "use" immunity provision,
Congress felt it was necessary to adopt a new immunity statute particularly applicable
to Interstate Commerce Commission proceedings in order to insure effective adminis-
tration of the Interstate Commerce Act. See 23 CONG. REc. 573 (1892) (remarks
of Senator Cullom).
36. Id. at 6333 (remarks of Senator Cullom).
37. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
38. Id. at 601, 606.
39. The Court frequently alluded to the absolute immunity requirement of
Counselman in assessing the constitutionality of subsequent immunity statutes. See,
e.g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965) ; Adams
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 146(1949); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428 (1943); United States v. Mur-
dock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
40. Prior to the adoption of 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) (see notes 53-56 and
accompanying text infra), there were over 50 such federal immunity statutes in effect.
See National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers,
1444-45 (1970). Nearly all these statutes were repealed with the enactment of the
Organized Crime Control Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 259-60, 84
Stat. 931, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970).
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the states to comply with the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 4' Having found the states so obliged to honor this privilege,
the Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission42 confronted the issue
of the scope of interjurisdictional protection required when testimony
compelled under a state grant of immunity criminally implicated the wit-
ness under federal law.43 The petitioners in Murphy had received im-
munity under the laws of New York and New Jersey, 44 but nevertheless
refused to testify, asserting that the desired testimony might have a tend-
ency to incriminate them under federal criminal law.45 The Court held
that the fifth amendment protected a witness who gave immunized testi-
mony in one jurisdiction from having that testimony used in a subsequent
prosecution by a non-immunizing jurisdiction.46 In so holding, the Court
repudiated its earlier position that testimony compelled by one juris-
diction could be utilized in another jurisdiction to convict the witness of
a crime.47 To secure protection coextensive with the fifth amendment
privilege, the Court fashioned an exclusionary rule,48 consistent with its
conclusion that the prosecuting jurisdiction could use neither the com-
pelled testimony nor its fruits in its subsequent prosecution.49
However, since the Murphy Court did not address itself to the scope
of protection required by the fifth amendment with respect to a subsequent
prosecution in the immunizing jurisdiction, it was unclear whether Murphy
was a complete repudiation of the "absolute immunity" seemingly required
by Counselman. Some commentators reached that conclusion,50  while
others viewed Murphy as specifically limited to interjurisdictional prob-
lems, under which the ability to prosecute an immunized witness was
retained only by the non-immunizing jurisdiction in a subsequent prosecu-
tion.51 This uncertainty was compounded by the Court's continued
reference in later cases to the Counselman "absolute immunity" dictum.5 2
41. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
42. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
43. Id. at 54.
44. Id. at 53.
45. Id. at 53-54.
46. Id. at 77-78.
47. Id. at 73. In United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), the Court
held that "full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government com-
pelling the witness to answer is sufficient and immunity from prosecution by anotherjurisdiction is not required." Id. at 149.
48. See notes 67-71 and accompanying text infra.
49. 378 U.S. at 79.
50. See, e.g., Note, supra note 6. That Murphy created doubts about the necessity
of full transactional immunity is illustrated by Byers v. People, 71 Cal. 2d 1039,
458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) ;
People v. La Bello, 24 N.Y.2d 598, 249 N.E.2d 412, 301 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1969), over-
ruled, Gold v. Menna, 25 N.Y.2d 475, 255 N.E.2d 235, 307 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1969).
See also note 57 infra.
51. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 23. See also note 57 infra.
52. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965). In
Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 244 (1966), the Court specifically reserved con-
sideration of whether "use/derivative use" immunity fulfilled the requirements of
Counselman. Cf. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 552 (1971) (Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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In the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,53 Congress enacted
an immunity provision which was designed to allow the federal govern-
ment, as an immunizing jurisdiction, to retain the right to subsequently
prosecute the witness for the crime to which his testimony referred, while
meeting the Murphy standard.5 4 That provision, section 6002, a product
of comprehensive study by the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws,5 5 provides in part that "no testimony or other
information compelled under the court order (or any information directly
or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be
used against the witness in any criminal case .... "56
The lower federal courts immediately split over the constitutional
sufficiency of this "use/derivative use" immunity, depending upon their
reading of the scope of Murphy and their view of the viability of the
Counselman dictum. 7 In reviewing contempt findings of witnesses re-
fusing to testify under a grant of section 6002 immunity, the Supreme
Court in Kastigar v. United States"5 recognized that the immunity pro-
vided did not comport with the "absolute immunity" language of Counsel-
man.59 But the Kastigar Court went on to indicate that the "broad
language [of Counselman] . . .was unnecessary to the Court's decision,"
and could not be considered "binding authority. '6 0 The Court then rea-
soned that the protection afforded by the fifth amendment privilege is
the same in both federal and state jurisdictions. 61 Consequently, if
Murphy's prohibition of the use of compelled testimony and its fruits
adequately vindicated fifth amendment rights in a non-immunizing juris-
diction, such protection must also adequately secure those identical rights
in the immunizing jurisdiction.62  Therefore, the Court concluded that
"use/derivative use" immunity is sufficient protection in any jurisdiction,
since it leaves the witness and the government in "substantially the same
position as if the witness had claimed his privilege. '63 Kastigar's holding
that immunity from use and derivative use of testimony is coextensive
53. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of
18, 28 U.S.C.).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
42 (1970); S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 50-52, 145 (1969).
55. See National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working
Papers, 1405-44 (1970).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
57. The Ninth Circuit upheld the statute over constitutional objections in
Bacon v. United States, 446 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1971); Charleston v. United States,
444 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 916 (1971) ; Stewart
v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971). However, the contrary position was
adopted by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215(5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.
1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972).
58. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
59. Id. at 452.
60. Id. at 454-55.
61. Id. at 458.
62. Id. at 458-59.
63. Id. at 458, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964)
(emphasis added).
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with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination has, however,
left important questions concerning its workable application unresolved.
III. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION AFFORDED
A. Non-evidentiary Use
Analysis of the difficulties arising in a criminal prosecution of a
previously immunized witness must begin with an attempt to delineate
the precise scope of protection afforded by the Kastigar decision. Initially,
it must be noted that the Court plainly focused on the necessity of ex-
cluding both the compelled testimony and evidence obtained in contraven-
tion of the terms of the immunity grant.6 4 Since neither section 6002 nor
the fifth amendment precluded a subsequent prosecution based upon evi-
dence derived from legitimate independent sources,6 5 the Court concluded:
This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive safeguard,
barring the use of compelled testimony as an "investigatory lead,"
and also barring the use of any evidence obtained by focusing in-
vestigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures.66
The Court analogized this protection to that provided by the exclusionary
rule employed in coerced confession cases.6 7 That rule, also utilized in
cases involving evidence derived from illegal arrests, searches, and
seizures68 excludes from trial that evidence which is metaphorically
deemed to be the "fruit of the poisonous tree."'69 In essence, it provides
that evidence which can be considered the product or fruit of a constitu-
tional violation will be inadmissible in a subsequent trial of the individual
in question. Thus, a confession obtained from a suspect in a manner
violative of his fifth amendment rights is excluded in criminal proceedings
against the unwilling "confessor. ' 70 Similarly, so-called "tainted" evi-
dence - that which is derived directly or indirectly by exploitation of
the primary illegality - cannot be utilized by the prosecution in estab-
lishing its case. 71
Perhaps the most illustrative Supreme Court case on the application
of the exclusionary rule in the context of coerced confessions is Harrison
v. United States,7 2 a case involving the situation in which the defendant
in a felony murder trial had taken the stand in his defense in an effort
to counter the prosecution's introduction of his three confessions. Since
64. Id. at 460-62.
65. Id. at 461.
66. Id. at 460 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 461. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) ; Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
68. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920).
69. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
70. See the cases cited in note 67 supra.
71. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). See text accompany-
ing notes 139-47 infra.
72. 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
COMMENTS
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1974], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss3/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the confessions had been illegally obtained and were therefore inadmis-
sible under the exclusionary rule, the defendant's subsequent conviction
was reversed, and a new trial ordered.73 At the second trial, the prosecu-
tion sought to introduce damaging admissions made by the defendant in
his testimony at the earlier proceeding. 74 The defendant asserted that
those statements were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree; that is,
he claimed that the prior testimony had to be excluded as evidence derived
from the illegality inherent in the erroneous admission of the three con-
fessions at his initial trial.7 5 The Supreme Court sustained this conten-
tion, holding that the government had the burden of establishing that its
illegal use of the unlawfully obtained confessions did not induce the
testimony. 78 Since the government failed to dispel the inference that such
adverse testimony would not have been given absent the use of the illegally
obtained confessions, the Court found that the burden had not been met
and the conviction at the second trial was accordingly set aside. 77
One rationale underlying the application of this rule in all cases is
simply that by removing the usefulness of illegally obtained evidence, the
incentive to violate a suspect's constitutionally protected rights will be
eliminated, and there will, consequently, be a deterrent effect upon such
improper governmental conduct in future cases.7 8 Additionally, in the
context of coerced confessions, there is a justifiable belief that such ex-
tracted statements are inherently unreliable.79 The rule itself, of course,
does not operate to remove the original illegality; nor does the original
illegality operate to preclude the state from pursuing a criminal prosecu-
tion based on the use of other evidence.8 0
In analogizing the protection afforded by section 6002 to that given
by the traditional exclusionary rule, the Court considered statements
compelled from the immunized witness to be similar to coerced confes-
sions. Yet the two situations are conceptually different. A coerced
confession is obtained in contravention of constitutionally secured rights;
statements given under a valid immunity grant, however, are the fruits of
legitimate governmental action. The exclusionary rule in the former
context, while serving the function of removing the incentive to engage
in future illegality, fails to remove the illegality. In the latter context
the statutory proscription against the use of compelled testimony or
evidence derived therefrom is designed to prevent any illegality from the
outset. In light of these differing purposes, it is plausible to suggest
73. Id. at 220.
74. Id. at 221.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 224-25.
77. Id. at 226.
78. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 513 (1966); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21
(1959).
79. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
80. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
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that the statutory proscription against use of immunized statements would
not, under all circumstances, be coextensive with the protection afforded
by the traditional exclusionary rule.8 ' However, it was clearly the design
of section 6002 to provide precisely that measure of protection, as shown
by the comments of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws concerning its proposal which became the basis for sec-
tion 6002:
Immunity from use is the only consequence flowing from a violation
of an individual's constitutional right to counsel, and his constitu-
tional right not to be coerced into confessing. The proposed im-
munity is thus of the same scope as that frequently, even though
unintentionally, conferred as the result of constitutional violations by
law enforcement officers.8 2
Underpinned by this analogy to the exclusionary rule, the Kastigar
Court's reasoning was directed toward the necessity of avoiding evi-
dentiary use of compelled testimony or evidence derived therefrom in
a subsequent criminal prosecution against the immunized witness. Section
6002 on its face, however, does not purport to preclude only such uses, but
rather simply provides that no compelled testimony or information derived
therefrom can be used in any criminal case against the witness.8 3 Other
potential uses of testimony compelled under such an immunity grant are
obvious. For example, the prosecutor could conceivably base his decision
to institute criminal proceedings on the content of the compelled testi-
mony, or the prosecutor may use his knowledge in formulating his trial
strategy or in tailoring his cross-examination of the defendant should the
latter decide to act as a witness in his own behalf. One such non-evi-
dentiary use was involved in United States v. McDaniel,8 4 a post-Murphy
interjurisdictional case. In 1969, McDaniel testified before a state grand
jury under a grant of full transactional immunity.85 A United States
attorney asked for and received a copy of the grand jury transcript con-
taining the compelled testimony, and federal charges were subsequently
pressed.8 6 The court held that the conduct of the United States attorney
amounted to a "prima facie use" of the testimony - a use proscribed
by the exclusionary rule of Murphy.87 In the court's view its conclusion
81. This distinction will most likely be significant in any future litigation which
may concern the extent to which the protection afforded under an immunity giant
differs from that given under the exclusionary rule. However, since the focus of this
Comment is upon the analysis of the Kastigar Court, which did not recognize the
distinction, it is not discussed in detail.
82. Second Interim Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws, Mar. 17, 1969, Working Papers of the Commission, 1446 (1970).
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
84. 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992 (1972).
85. 449 F.2d at 834. The immunity grant was essentially identical to that pro-
vided in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). See notes 37-40 and accompanying
text supra.
86. 449 F.2d at 835.
87. Id. at 837. See notes 42-49 and accompanying text supra.
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was mandated by the requirement of Murphy that the immunized witness
and prosecuting jurisdiction be left in substantially the same position as
if there had been no compelled testimony.88 However, the entire reason-
ing of the McDaniel court was predicated upon its view that the im-
munizing jurisdiction was constitutionally required, even after Murphy,
to confer full transactional immunity, forbidding any subsequent prosecu-
tion concerning that to which the testimony related.8 9 If the immunizing
jurisdiction could compel testimony under an immunity grant and subse-
quently prosecute the witness with relation to the subject of his testimony,
then it would appear to follow that the prosecuting jurisdiction must have
the right to merely see that testimony, as long as the testimony is in no way
improperly used in a subsequent criminal investigation and prosecution.
Since the Kastigar Court has established the erroneous nature of
McDaniel's underlying premise requiring transactional immunity,90 it
appears basic that such non-evidentiary use is not precluded. The Kastigar
Court's analogy to the exclusionary rule in coerced confession cases
further supports this conclusion,9' for the Court has never indicated in
connection with those cases that mere possession by the prosecutor of
knowledge of the contents of an illegally obtained statement is violative
of a defendant's constitutionally secured rights. In fact, the Court tacitly
recognized the acceptability of such possession in Harris v. New York, 92
wherein it permitted a defendant's statement, inadmissible in the prosecu-
tion's case in chief, to be used by the prosecution to impeach the defendant
when he elected to testify in his own behalf.93
At least as far as the immunizing jurisdiction is concerned, preclusion
of access to compelled testimony would be essentially unworkable. The
attorney conducting the prosecution may have been present at the grand
jury when the testimony was given, and, even if he was not present, it
would be essentially impossible for him to avoid access to the testimony
in some form, given the communication necessary for the effective opera-
tion of the prosecutor's office. 94 Such considerations, however, do not
apply in the interjurisdictional context. One can more readily preclude
a non-immunizing, prosecuting jurisdiction from obtaining the contents
of the compelled testimony. Since such testimony will often be given in
88. 449 F.2d at 837.
89. Id. at 838.
90. 406 U.S. at 458-59.
91. Id. at 461.
92. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See notes 107-14 and accompanying text infra.
93. 401 U.S. at 226.
94. In fact, this inability to isolate a prosecutor of the immunizing jurisdiction
from even unwitting access to the compelled testimony was a basis for Justice
Marshall's dissent in Kastigar. In concluding that use/derivative use immunity would
be constitutionally inadequate in the immunizing jurisdiction, he noted:
[T]he paths of information through the investigative bureaucracy may well be
long and winding, and even a prosecutor acting in the best of faith cannot be
certain that somewhere in the depths of his investigative apparatus, often including
hundreds of employees, there was not some prohibited use of the compelled
testimony.
406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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secret, affirmative efforts by the prosecutor will be required in order to
gain access to the desired information. The Kastigar Court, however,
indicated that the protection afforded by the fifth amendment is the same
whether the prosecution is instituted by the immunizing or non-immunizing
jurisdiction. 95 Consequently, if such non-evidentiary use is not constitu-
tionally precluded in the case of the immunizing jurisdiction, it is not
precluded in a subsequent prosecution by the non-immunizing jurisdiction.
While the Kastigar rationale has been criticized for failing to adequately
protect defendants from such use,96 the Court's reasoning again represents
an attempt to establish a rational accommodation between conflicting in-
terests. Apparently, society's legitimate interest in procuring the com-
pelled testimony outweighed the minimal diminution of individual rights
which may be occasioned. 91
B. Use to Impeach
Another potential use of compelled testimony confronting the previ-
ously immunized witness may arise in the event he elects to testify in
his own behalf. The prosecution, rather than using the compelled testi-
mony for the purpose of establishing the defendant's guilt, may nonethe-
less attempt to utilize it on cross-examination for the purpose of im-
peaching the defendant's credibility as a witness.98 Assuming that the
prior statements are otherwise admissible for such a purpose and are not
precluded as having been given in secret, 9  the question is whether the
prior grant of immunity operates to prevent such use of the statements.
At first glance one might conclude, solely on the basis of visceral reaction,
that such employment of the compelled testimony to discredit the witness-
defendant is obviously designed to enhance the possibility that criminal
sanctions will be imposed. Thus, superficially at least, the compelled
testimony will have a tendency to incriminate. However, in-depth
analysis of the Court's position on the use of otherwise inadmissible
evidence for impeachment purposes indicates that there is room for doubt.
95. Id. at 458.
96. Reif, The Grand Jury Witness and Compulsory Testimony Legislation, 10
Am. CRIM. L. REv. 829, 856-58 (1972).
97. To insure that individual rights are successfully vindicated, the Kastigar
Court, however, imposed a heavy burden of proof upon the government to affirma-
tively establish that its evidence is derived from sources independent of the compelled
testimony. See notes 125-38 and accompanying text infra.
98. For a discussion of methods by which a witness can be impeached, see
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 33-50 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
99. Testimony before grand juries traditionally is given in secret to insure the
grand jury's freedom of action and to protect the reputations of those investigated
but not subsequently indicted. See Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455
(1965); Comment, Secrecy in Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal for a New
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 307 (1969). FED. R.
CRIm. P. 6(e), for example, provides that testimony given in secret before a federal
grand jury may be disclosed only with court approval.
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In Walder v. United States,00 the Court confronted a situation in
which a prosecutor sought to impeach a defendant on a collateral matter
with physical evidence otherwise inadmissible under the exclusionary
rule. The defendant, charged with various narcotics violations, testified
on direct examination that he had never sold, given, or otherwise handled
narcotics.' 0' On cross-examination, he was asked whether narcotics had
been taken from him in a previous arrest.10 2 Although defendant replied
in the negative, the government independently established that heroin had
been taken from him on the occasion in question - albeit in contravention
of his fourth amendment rights.'03 In sustaining the admission of this
evidence solely on the issue of the defendant's credibility, the Court dis-
tinguished such use of tainted evidence from use in the prosecution's
affirmative case to show culpability:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative
use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that
the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the
Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and pro-
vide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.'0
The evidence admitted in Walder possessed a high degree of reli-
ability and was indeed highly probative on the issue of the defendant's
credibility.10 5 That evidence may be contrasted to the coerced confession,
involuntarily given by a suspect and a product of oppressive governmental
conduct. Exclusion of the coerced confession is justified not only to deter
the objectionable conduct, but also with an awareness of its inherent
unreliability. 06 However, a defendant's illegally obtained statements
may be used to impeach him as a witness. The Court in Harris v. New
York10 7 applied the Walder rationale in allowing the defendant to be
impeached with his prior inconsistent statements, inadmissible in the
prosecution's case in chief. Charged with selling heroin to an under-
cover policeman, the defendant testified that, while he had made a sale,
he had sold baking powder in an attempt to defraud the purchaser. 08
On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to introduce the defendant's
prior statements to the police which contradicted his in-court testimony. 0 9
100. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
101. Id. at 63.
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 65.
105. Id. The government put on the stand one of the officers who had participated
in the unlawful search and seizure along with a chemist who had analyzed the seized
heroin capsule. Id. at 64.
106. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
107. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority,
80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained
Evidence: The Rule of Harris v. New York, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 441.
108. 401 U.S. at 223.
109. Id.
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These statements, bearing directly on the issue of the defendant's guilt,
were clearly inadmissible in the prosecution's affirmative case since they
had been obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,"0 which imposed
upon the police the duty to inform an accused of his constitutionally
secured rights before a custodial interrogation."' In sustaining the use
of these statements solely for the purpose of impeaching the defendant,
the Court considered it insignificant that they, unlike the impeaching
evidence in Walder, related to matters directly bearing on the issue of
the defendant's guilt." 2 The Court noted that the deterrence rationale
underlying the exclusionary rule would not be served by exclusion in
this context, and found "sufficient deterrence" in the preclusion of use
in the prosecution's case in chief.113 Thus, while a defendant might choose
to testify in his own defense, this "privilege [could] not be construed to
include the right to commit perjury.""14 Having taken the stand, the
defendant undertook the obligation to testify truthfully and could not
rely on the exclusionary rule to enhance his position with regard to
his credibility.
The rationale of Harris arguably applies to a defendant threatened
with impeachment on the basis of prior statements compelled under a
grant of "use/derivative use" immunity. 1 5 Clearly, such a defendant
has no more right than the defendant in Harris to commit perjury at
his trial. Although he is compelled to testify, as is the individual from
whom a confession is involuntarily extracted, his testimony is not subject
to the same degree of doubt as to its reliability since it is given under
oath. Nor is the deterrence rationale apropos, for there can be no deter-
rence of illegality nonexistent in the first instance. Exclusion under the
immunity grant is in essence a constitutionally mandated recognition by
the state that, upon the grant of immunity, it will not unlawfully employ
the incriminating testimony elicited to establish its criminal case against
a witness.
Broad language in Kastigar and other considerations, however, sug-
gest a limited application of Harris in the immunity grant context. In
commenting upon the scope of protection granted under section 6002,
the Kastigar Court noted:
[Section 6002] prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the
compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that
110. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
111. Id. at 444--45.
112. 401 U.S. at 225.
113. Id. The Court considered it speculative to suggest that impermissible police
conduct would be encouraged by allowing statements otherwise inadmissible to be
used for impeachment purposes. Id. It does seem unlikely that police will improperly
solicit statements which can be used only if the defendant takes the stand at trial,
and then only if he gives perjured testimony. With the utility of improperly elicited
statements so limited, legitimate efforts to obtain statements admissible in the prose-
cution's case in chief would appear to be more advantageous.
114. Id.
115. See Comment, Impeachment, Use Immunity and the Perjurious Defendant,
77 DicK. L. REv. 23 (1972).
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the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on
the witness."16
It is unclear whether this reference is indicative of the Court's intention
to totally preclude the use of compelled testimony, including use for
impeachment. Even if Harris is applicable, however, it should not be
read to give a carte blanche to the prosecutor. In United States v.
Hockenberry,"7 the Third Circuit suggested a basis for potential limita-
tion of Harris. Hockenberry, a former county detective, had been given
full transactional immunity and, in the course of his immunized testimony
before a federal grand jury, had admitted signing affidavits in which he
falsely asserted personal knowledge of the facts upon which search
warrants were to be based."' At his subsequent trial for making false
material declarations to the grand jury, he testified in his own behalf to
deny the charges in the indictment. The prosecution then sought to
impeach his credibility as a witness by utilizing the statements made
before the grand jury to show a pattern of deceit." 9 The court held that
such compelled admissions of wrongdoing obtained under a grant of im-
munity could not later be used to discredit the witness' effort to defend
himself against a charge of some other wrongdoing. 20 The court found
that Harris was not controlling, distinguishing it as merely a delineation
of the scope of protection necessary to insure compliance by the authori-
ties with the Miranda procedural requirements. 121
It is submitted that the true rationale underlying Harris was that
the defendant-witness should not be permitted to safely commit perjury
while relying upon the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, thereby
subverting the truth-finding process of the adversary proceeding. Accord-
ingly, Harris permitted impeachment to the extent that prior reliable
statements were inconsistent with in-court testimony. 22 Walder indicated
that reliable extrinsic evidence may also be used for impeachment pur-
poses. 23 In contrast to those cases in which the defendant was attempting
to enhance his position in reliance upon the inadmissibility of contrary
evidence, the defendant in Hockenberry did not attempt to subvert the
adversary nature of the proceedings by giving testimony contrary to reliable,
but excluded, evidence. Rather, the prosecutor sought to improve the
government's case with the introduction of the admissions contained in the
compelled testimony. 24 Enhancement of the government's position in that
116. 406 U.S. at 453.
117. 474 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1973).
118. Id. at 248.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 250.
121. Id.
122. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See text accompanying notes
107-14 supra.
123. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). See text accompanying notes
100-06 supra.
124. 474 F.2d at 248.
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context does not necessarily fall within the Harris rationale. Arguably,
such improvement of the government's case does have a tendency to in-
criminate the defendant and therefore is violative of an immunity grant.
Accordingly, it would seem that if statements compelled under an im-
munity grant are admissible at all for impeachment purposes under
Harris, their use must be restricted to the situation in which they are in
direct conflict with in-court testimony. The same limitation may also be
imposed upon such use of derivative evidence improperly obtained through
the use of immunized compelled testimony.
C. The Procedural Posture
Although there has been a liberalizing trend in recent years,1 25 the
defendant in a criminal proceeding has only a limited ability to discover
the prosecution's case against him.126 With discovery virtually precluded,
a defendant who has previously testified under a grant of immunity is
severely hindered in any effort to insure that the evidence used against
him is not illegally derived from his compelled testimony. In recognition
of this disability, the Kastigar Court imposed upon the government the
burden of establishing that its evidence was not improperly attributable
to the immunized statements. The Court offered the following charac-
terization of this burden:
This burden of proof ... is not limited to a negation of taint; rather,
it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the
evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.' 27
In providing this procedural safeguard for the defendant, however,
the Court failed to adequately specify the appropriate standard by which
the government's burden is to be discharged, and widely divergent views
have followed in its wake. At one extreme is the suggestion that the
125. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1850-55(b), 1859(g), 1863 (3d ed. 1940);
Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1960);
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE UJ. 1149 (1960).
126. For example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) grants a defendant the limited right
to discover his own prior statements which are possessed by the government, the
results of examinations and experiments, and his own grand jury testimony. While
he does not necessarily have a right to a full grand jury transcript, FED. R. CGlM. P.
16(b) allows such discovery along with other papers and tangible objects in the
government's possession "upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of his
defense and that the request is reasonable." The subsection, however, expressly states
that it does not authorize discovery of reports, memoranda, or other internal govern-
mental documents made by government agents in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of the defendant's case, nor does it authorize discovery of statements
made by government witnesses or prospective witnesses to governmental agents. Id.
The defendant is given a limited right to discovery of pre-trial statements of the
government's witnesses under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). He may obtain such state-
ments in the possession of the government, however, only after the witness has actually
testified on direct examination at trial and if the prior statements relate to the subject
matter of the witness' in-court testimony. Id. § 3500(a), (b).
127. 406 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added).
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prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt that its evidence was
derived from a legitimate independent source. 12 8 Alternatively, the gov-
ernment's burden has been analogized to that imposed in coerced confes-
sion cases when the defendant challenges the admissibility of a confession
on the ground that it was involuntarily given."n In Lego v. Twomey,1
0
the Court found such a determination of voluntariness predicated upon a
mere preponderance of the evidence to be constitutionally sufficient.' 3'
It is submitted that the preponderance standard of Lego may not be
applicable in the case of prosecution of a previously immunized witness.
In that context there need be no determination of voluntariness com-
parable to that in a coerced confession case, for it is obvious that im-
munized statements compelled under the threat of contempt charges are
involuntary. 3 2 The Kastigar Court, in fact, adopted the position that the
mere assertion by a defendant that he testified under an immunity grant
would operate to "shift to the government the heavy burden of proving
that all the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate in-
dependent sources."183 Such a burden is comparable to that imposed upon
the government to establish that its evidence is derived independently of
a coerced confession once the element of coercion is established.13 4 Fur-
thermore, in the context of an adversary hearing on the issue of the
voluntariness of a confession, such as in Lego, both the government and
the defendant have access to facts relating to coercion and can adduce
proof from which a determination of voluntariness can be made. A pre-
viously immunized defendant, however, is at a clear disadvantage in
seeking to establish improper use of compelled testimony, for under
most rules of criminal procedure, he generally has no right of access to
any of the government's reports, memoranda, or other documents pre-
pared in connection with the investigation or prosecution of his case.' 35
The insufficiency of a preponderance standard is obvious where consti-
tutionally secured rights are jeopardized and only the government pos-
sesses the information which could establish whether those rights have
been protected. 36 This conclusion finds support in the Kastigar Court's
imposition upon the government of a burden heavier than a mere "nega-
128. See Note, The Scope of Testimonial Immunity Under the Fifth Amendment:
Kastigar v. United States, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 350, 382 (1973).
129. See Note, Immunity and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2 Am. J. CRIM. L. 29,
44-45 (1973).
130. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
131. Id. at 484.
132. 406 U.S. at 461-62.
133. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
134. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968). See notes 72-77 and accom-
panying text supra.
135. See notes 125-26 supra.
136. This insufficiency becomes even more apparent when the prosecuting attorney
may not be fully aware of the course of the investigation and prosecution in a par-
ticular case. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) ; Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
468 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ; Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568-69
(1971) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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tion of taint. 1 37 At the very least, the government would apparently be
required to trace the development of its evidence, setting forth the in-
vestigative steps leading to its acquisition, and thereby show clearly and
convincingly a source for the evidence completely independent of the
compelled testimony. 88
A further significant problem related to the government's burden of
persuasion arises from the requirement that the evidence be derived from
an independent source.Y8 9 Evidence which is derived from a totally in-
dependent legitimate source is clearly admissible as untainted by any
illegality. 140 However, even if a causal connection is established relating evi-
dence to a constitutional violation, the evidence is not necessarily excluded.
The Supreme Court has recognized that such a causal connection may
have become so attenuated that any taint upon the evidence attributable
to the original unlawful conduct is dissipated. 14 1 The Court in Wong
Sin v. United States 42 framed the proper consideration as follows:
[T]he .. .question ...is "whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."'14
The doctrine was applied in Wong Sun to find a defendant's confession
properly admissible. Wong Sun, the subject of an illegal arrest in viola-
tion of his fourth amendment rights, 44 argued that his confession was
the result of the arrest and, therefore, had to be excluded as a fruit of
the poisonous tree. 4 5 However, Wong Sun, after his illegal arrest, had
been released on his own recognizance and voluntarily returned several
days later to give his incriminating statement to the authorities. 146 Under
such circumstances, the Court concluded that the causal connection be-
137. 406 U.S. at 460.
138. Furthermore, if the preponderance standard is found sufficient in this context,
the defendant should be entitled to access to the government's files to successfully
rebut any colorable case made by the government. Having established standing simply
by showing that he has previously testified under an immunity grant, the defendant
might argue that, under Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), he is en-
titled to discovery of the government's files. The Nardone decision provided that if
that defendant has shown a violation of his constitutional rights, he is entitled to the
opportunity to prove that "a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of
the poisonous tree," id. at 341, and it could be argued that such an opportunity requires
access to governmental files. See also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
180-85 (1969) (requiring the government to disclose surveillance files to defendant
whose fourth amendment rights were shown to have been violated by illegal wire-
tapping). Additionally, prior statements of government agents who testified in
support of the government's case for admissibility should be discoverable under 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). See note 126 supra.
139. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
140. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
141. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
142. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
143. Id. at 488, quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959) (emphasis
added).
144. 371 U.S. at 491.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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tween the illegal arrest and the confession was so remote as to prevent the
application of the exclusionary rule.147
Although the precise scope of the attenuation doctrine is subject to
dispute, 48 the critical question is whether it is properly applicable at all
in a subsequent prosecution of a previously immunized witness. Argu-
ably, there is a conceptual basis which would support the adoption of a
strictly causal relationship test in this context rather than the more
liberal attenuation concept employed in Wong Sun. That case and its
progenitors1 49 dealt with the exclusionary rule as a device to vindicate
fourth amendment rights. The proscription of illegal searches, seizures,
and arrests under the fourth amendment is designed to secure the privacy
of the individual from governmental invasions and harassment. 150 Since
the focus in fourth amendment violation cases is not upon the effect at
trial but on the effect upon future governmental activities, any exclu-
sionary rule fashioned to protect those rights is constitutionally adequate
if it excludes evidence obtained by "exploitation" of that illegality. 5 1
Where there has been no governmental exploitation of unlawfulness,
that aim of deterrence would not be served by exclusion of evidence.
Accordingly, if but a remote causal connection is established, evidence
may nonetheless be properly admitted. In contrast, however, when testi-
mony is compelled under an immunity grant, the witness' statutory
protection, to be consonant with the mandate of the fifth amendment,
must apply directly to the criminal proceeding. Exclusion in the im-
munity grant context is designed to guarantee that prior statements will
have no incriminating effect at a subsequent prosecution, 152 rather than
to deter future governmental conduct. If there is any causal relationship
between the compelled testimony and the acquisition of the evidence
proposed to be used at the later trial, it would appear to follow that the
compelled testimony in fact has the prohibited incriminating effect, not-
withstanding the remoteness of the causal link. Therefore, only evidence
147. Id.
148. United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
913 (1970) (evidence traceable to primary illegality admissible if circumstances show
it would have been inevitably discovered without illegality); accord, People v. Ditson,
57 Cal. 2d 415, 369 P.2d 714, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1962). Cf. United States v. Par-
outian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962) (inevitable discovery argument rejected).
Paroutian was followed in United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y.
1968). See also Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized,
56 CALIF. L. REV. 579 (1968); Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea for
Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136 (1967).
149. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
150. The language of the amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The right of
privacy secured by the fourth amendment has been characterized by the Court as
"at the core of the Fourth Amendment" and "basic to a free society." Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
151. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), quoting J. MAGUIRF,
EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959).
152. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
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derived from sources completely independent of the compelled testimony
would be properly usable.153 This conclusion finds support in the Kastigar
Court's language requiring the evidence to be derived from a "legitimate
source, wholly independent of the compelled testimony."' 5 4 This argu-
ment is further bolstered by statements in Harrison v. United States,x55
wherein the Court noted that "[i]t thus appears that, but for the use of
his confessions, the petitioner might not have testified at all."' 56 Although
the Court in Harrison approvingly referred to the Wong. Sun attenuation
formulation, 157 this "but for" language along with the strong Kastigar
statements suggests the adoption of a causal test in this context in lieu of
the more liberal attenuation doctrine.
IV. REFUSAL TO TESTIFY
The post-Kastigar uncertainties described above may justifiably cause
distress to any witness who, after refusing to testify on the basis of his
fifth amendment privilege, is then confronted with the compulsion to
testify imposed by an immunity grant under section 6002. The following,
therefore, is directed toward those circumstances under which a witness
may refuse to testify on the ground that the immunity grant in its appli-
cation fails to provide protection coextensive with the privilege it pur-
ports to supplant.
A. Threat of Foreign Prosecution
The first of two potential, but limited, objections is of constitutional
dimension, applicable under any immunity grant. It is predicated upon
the unresolved question of whether the fifth amendment operates to pro-
tect a witness from incriminating himself under the laws of a foreign
country. If the privilege does provide protection of such scope, no national
immunity grant could successfully vindicate the rights of a witness who,
through his testimony, might expose himself to such criminal sanctions.
In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation,'" the
Court most artfully avoided a determination of this issue. A commission,
investigating organized crime in New Jersey, had granted use/derivative
use immunity to Zicarelli upon his refusal to testify on fifth amendment
grounds.159 In spite of that he persisted in his refusal to answer, claim-
ing that responsive answers would pose a threat of prosecution under
foreign law.' 60 The Court concluded that only one question posed by
153. Cf. Note, Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935,
1038 n.21 (1966). See Pitler, supra note 148, at 620.
154. 406 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added).
155. 392 U.S. 219 (1968). See notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
156. 392 U.S. at 225 (footnote omitted).
157. Id. at 226.
158. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
159. Id. at 474.
160. Id. at 478.
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the commission - an inquiry into those geographic areas in which the
witness had Cosa Nostra responsibilities - even arguably created such
a threat.1 61 In the context of an investigation of organized crime in New
Jersey, however, the Court found this question, concerned only geographic
areas within New Jersey.162 To have divulged Cosa Nostra responsi-
bilities on an international level in response to the question would have,
according to the Court, involved information irrelevant to the scope of
the investigation. With the question so limited, a proper answer would
present no real danger of foreign incrimination, and the Court conse-
quently found it unnecessary to consider the constitutional issue.168
Applying the underlying rationale of Zicarelli, the Fifth Circuit in
the case of In re Tierney16 4 found no substantial risk of foreign prosecu-
tion posed in the context of testimony compelled under section 6002 before
a federal grand jury.165 The fact that such testimony was given in strict
secrecy was considered sufficient to eliminate any real danger of foreign
prosecution in light of the fact that disclosure of the secret testimony
could not be made without court order. 16G The Tierney court reasoned
that if any substantial likelihood of foreign prosecution appeared upon
a request for disclosure, the court could simply refuse to make the testi-
mony available.' 67 If the Tierney court is correct in this regard, the
potential, narrow exception in favor of those witnesses whose testimony
might lead to the imposition of criminal sanctions under foreign law will
be further limited. Only witnesses testifying in a non-secret proceeding
could possibly assert fear of foreign prosecution as a basis for refusing
to testify.
The Tierney rationale was rejected by the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut in the case of In re Cardassi.68
The district judge reasoned that, if the fifth amendment privilege did
extend to protect one from incriminating himself under foreign law, the
requirements imposed by Kastigar must be met in order to insure con-
stitutional vindication of fifth amendment rights.169 Mere secrecy did
not even remotely provide the Kastigar protection from use and derivative
use of compelled statements by a foreign jurisdiction, necessary to remove
any potentially incriminating effect.170 This argument suggests the under-
161. Id. at 479-80.
162. Id. at 480.
163. Id. at 481. See also In re Cahalane, 361 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 485
F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973) (mem.
164. 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
165. Accord, In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot sub
nor., Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96 (1970).
166. 465 F.2d at 812. See note 99 supra.
167. 465 F.2d at 812.
168. 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D.C. Conn. 1972).
169. Id. at 1083.
170. Id. Unfortunately, this argument was not extensively developed by the court.
It is based upon the conclusion that secrecy does not afford adequate constitutional
protection in either the Kastigar or Murphy context. An assurance of secrecy by thejurisdiction compelling the testimony does not fulfill the Kastigar requirement, for it
alone does not insure that the testimony will not be used in a subsequent criminal
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lying conceptual difficulty with the Tierney rationale. Tierney confused
the threat of prosecution arising from compelled testimony with the threat
of incrimination inherent in those statements. While this confusion stems
from the reference in Zicarelli to the lack of any real danger of foreign
prosecution, the Zicarelli Court clearly focused on the lack of any real
danger of foreign incrimination posed by a truly responsive answer to
the question propounded. 1 1 A witness testifying in secret before a
federal grand jury must reasonably believe that his statements will im-
plicate him in conduct criminal under state law to justify reliance upon
his fifth amendment privilege. It is against this incrimination which his
privilege protects him, and its assertion is not dependent upon the likeli-
hood that he will be prosecuted. Clearly, under Murphy, the constitu-
tional guarantee against self-incrimination requires that a federal or state
witness be assured before testifying that none of his compelled state-
ments or evidence derived therefrom will be used against him in a
subsequent prosecution by the non-immunizing jurisdiction. 1 72  Thus,
if the fifth amendment protects one from incriminating himself under
foreign laws, testimony cannot be compelled absent the initial assurance
against use which is mandated by Murphy.
Even if the secrecy requirement of grand jury proceedings should
be considered sufficient to permit compelling testimony before the grand
jury over an assertion of foreign incrimination, the Cardassi court's
further consideration of the constitutional issue is nonetheless highly
significant, for testimony can legitimately be compelled under section
6002 in non-secret situations before any federal court or agency.'1 7  In
squarely confronting the constitutional issue, the Cardassi court focused
upon questions propounded to the immunized witness which related to
prosecution by that jurisdiction. Furthermore, it fails to provide the required consti-
tutional guarantee of Murphy - that another jurisdiction in the federal context will
not utilize the compelled statements in a criminal prosecution. Positing that the fifth
amendment privilege extends to protect one from incriminating himself under foreign
laws, the question, therefore, becomes whether mere secrecy of the testimony will
then provide the constitutionally mandated protection, absent any concomitant assur-
ance against use of the compelled testimony by a foreign prosecuting jurisdiction.
Secrecy of the testimony does not in and of itself insure that a foreign prosecutor
will not somehow obtain the testimony and use it against the witness in a criminal
proceeding. The potential incriminating effect therefore remains, and full constitu-
tional protection required by Kastigar has not been provided.
171. The Ziccarelli Court did state that a constitutional issue would be presented
if the inquiry was "into matters that might incriminate [the witness] under foreign
law and pose a substantial risk of foreign prosecution . . . ." 406 U.S. at 481 (em-
phasis added). But in finding no constitutional issue presented, the Court simply
concluded that the witness "was never in any real danger of being compelled to dis-
close information that might incriminate him under foreign law." Id. at 480.
172. See notes 41-52 and accompanying text supra.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) is applicable:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,(2) an agency of the United States, or(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House . ...
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marihuana smuggling activities in Mexico. It was shown that Mexican
law penalized exporting and trafficking in marihuana as well as aiding
and abetting such an offense.174 Because the questions directly related
to activities in another country, unlike those of Zicarelli, the court found
that a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution existed and that the rationale
of Murphy operated to preclude any compulsory disclosure. 175 Reliance
was placed upon dictum in Murphy which stated, in effect, that the fifth
amendment privilege has the same scope as its English ancestor 176 under
which a witness could refuse to furnish information if a threat of incrimi-
nation under foreign law would thereby be raised. 1 77  This Murphy
dictum, when considered with an examination of the recognized policies
underlying the privilege, reveals that the Cardassi conclusion has sub-
stantial foundation. Those policies, as articulated in Murphy, include an
unwillingness to subject suspects to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusa-
tion, perjury or contempt;" a preference for an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system; a fear of inhumane treatment employed to elicit
incriminating statements; a sense of fair play in requiring the govern-
ment to establish guilt independently ;178 and a respect for the right of
the individual to a "private enclave where he may lead a private life."
17 9
Since nearly all of these policies are arguably relevant when the threat
of incrimination arises under foreign law, it seems that the privilege would
be well served by holding it applicable in that context.' 80
B. A Section 6002 Statutory Construction Problem
A second potential basis for refusal to testify is predicated upon a
statutory construction problem unique to section 6002. The precise
wording of the statute operates to preclude use and derivative use of
174. 351 F. Supp. at 1084.
175. Id. at 1084-85.
176. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1964).
177. See, e.g., United States v. McRae, L.R., 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867); East India
Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749). Cf. King of The Two Sicilies v.
Willcox, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851).
178. 378 U.S. at 55.
179. Id., quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., dissenting), revd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
180. It has been suggested, however, that the most basic policy underlying the
privilege - fear of inhumane treatment - is not applicable where the future prosecu-
tion is by a foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., McNaughton, Self-Incrimination Under
Foreign Law, 45 VA. L. Ray. 1299 (1959) . If the prosecution is unable to use com-
pelled incriminating statements in an effort to convict the witness, it is argued that
the incentive to violate fifth amendment rights with coercive tactics is thereby re-
moved. Murphy, in holding that the privilege extends to preclude use of compelled
testimony or its fruits by a non-immunizing jurisdiction, has clearly established the
erroneous nature of this argument with respect to internal jurisdictions. There seems to
be no reason to differentiate the threat of prosecution posed by an external jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the argument is based upon the erroneous assumption that there
will not be cooperative efforts between prosecuting authorities. It is not beyond the
realm of possibility that law enforcement agencies of different countries may unite in
an effort to control criminal conduct within the borders of each. Accordingly, it may
be in the interest of a prosecutor in one jurisdiction to compel testimony incriminating
under laws of another, even though he may be constitutionally precluded from using
it to obtain a conviction.
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compelled testimony in a subsequent prosecution, "except [in] a prosecu-
tion for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order [of immunity]."181 Although Kastigar upheld the facial
constitutionality of section 6002, this exceptive language has raised ques-
tions concerning the statute's legitimacy in a narrow class of cases.
The problem first arose in connection with an investigation by the
FBI of a firebombing at Claremont Men's College in California in 1971.
During the course of the investigation, Sara Baldinger made statements
concerning the fire to special agents. Subsequently, she was served with
a subpoena to testify before a federal grand jury, and at that appearance
she invoked her fifth amendment privilege. 1 82 In opposition to the govern-
ment's application for immunity in the case of In re Baldinger,18 she
argued that the exceptive language of section 6002 would render any
grant of immunity in her case constitutionally insufficient, claiming that
her answers under oath would allegedly show that false statements had
been given to the investigating agents prior to any immunity grant.18 4
Such testimony could be used to subject the witness to criminal liability
for the federal offense of giving false statements,'8 " unless the immunity
grant operated to preclude such use. As the exceptive language expressly
permitted use of the compelled statements in a subsquent prosecution
for giving false statements, the immunity grant was assertedly constitu-
tionally inadequate for failing to protect the witness - as would the
fifth amendment - from an incriminating effect in connection with the
previously given statements. 8 6 The government argued, however, that
the exception permitting prosecution for false statements did not apply
to previously given false statements but rather to false statements given
in connection with the grand jury testimony after immunity attached. 187
In rejecting the government's assertion, the district judge in Baldinger
noted that giving false testimony under oath before the grand jury con-
stituted the offense of perjury, 88 separate and distinct from the offense
of giving false statements. 8 9 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the
traditional statutory construction precept of giving effect to the plain
meaning of the words of a statute indicated that Congress plainly intended
181. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) (emphasis added).
182. In re Baldinger, 356 F. Supp. 153, 154-55 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
183. 356 F. Supp. 153 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
184. Id. at 157.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970), provides:
Whoever, in any manner within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false ... statements ...
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.Id.
186. 356 F. Supp. at 157.
187. Id.
188. The offense of perjury is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970), which provides:
Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person ...
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter whichhe does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall .. .be fined not more
than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
189. 356 F. Supp. at 159.
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to carve out two different exceptions to the immunity grant in its reference
to perjury and giving false statements.190 Only the offense of perjury
could be considered to cover subsequent untruthful statements made in
the context of testimony given before the grand jury. The court, there-
fore, concluded that if any effect is to be given to the language relating to
the giving of false statements in this context, it must be deemed to refer
to false statements previously given to the federal agents.191 On that
basis the court refused to order immunity as requested by the govern-
ment, on the ground that in its application the immunity grant would not
be coextensive with the witness' fifth amendment privilege.' 92
The Baldinger reasoning treats a situation distinct from possibilities
of foreign incrimination in which a witness is conceivably not afforded
adequate protection by the application of an immunity statute. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the court's reasoning is of doubtful validity. The
court's focus upon the grand jury proceedings in construing the statute
was entirely too narrow, although it was probably precipitated by the
government's argument that the phrase "giving false statements" ex-
tended only to those statements given in connection with grand jury
testimony. 1 3 Section 6002 is not limited to conferrals of immunity to
grand jury witnesses, but extends the immunity grant to any witness
refusing "to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
any court, grand jury or agency of the United States or either House of
Congress."' 9 4 Because the grand jury is plainly not the only forum of
immunity, it is entirely possible that immunity could be granted to a wit-
ness in a context when untruthful statements given after the immunity
grant are not given under oath and simply constitute the offense of giving
false statements rather than perjury.1 5 Accordingly, it seems entirely
possible that the Baldinger court could have given effect to the plain words
of the statute by concluding that the statutory exception applied only to
such future incriminating statements. Thus the court could have pro-
vided protection co-extensive with the fifth amendment without finding
section 6002 unconstitutional in its application. This conclusion finds
further support in the legislative history which indicates that the im-
munity exceptions were intended to apply only to prospective statements
made after a conferral of immunity.'9 6 This exceptive language, which
was in fact considered unnecessary, was included only as a precautionary
device to insure that an immunity grant did not protect such future state-
190. Id.
191. Id. at 164-66.
192. Id. at 167.
193. Id. at 157.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
195. For example, an immunity grant could conceivably protect the witness from
use of any statements made before FBI agents in connection with an investigation.
If such statements are not made under oath, the offense of perjury is not applicable,
while the offense of giving false statements is. See notes 185 & 188 supra.
196. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970); S. REP. No.
91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1969).
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ments.' 97 In recognition of this, Judge Ditter, of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, declined to follow the ruling of Baldinger under analogous
circumstances in the case of In re Cahalane.'98 Concluding that the excep-
tions to the immunity grant operated only upon future statements and con-
duct, Judge Ditter made the additional observation that such construction
of the statute comported with the elementary principle that statutes should
be construed whenever possible to sustain their constitutionality. 99
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis inevitably leads to two conclusions. Initially,
it is apparent that uncertainties persist in the subsequent prosecution of a
witness immunized under a grant of use/derivative use immunity. Second,
it is apparent that recognition of the constitutional sufficiency of use/de-
rivative use immunity has emasculated the scope of protection previously
thought to be constitutionally mandated by the fifth amendment. A wit-
ness is still subject to criminal prosecution, and his ability to avoid com-
pulsory testimony is drastically limited to arguable and narrow situations.
The impact of Kastigar is still uncertain, but it has been suggested
that an anomalous result might be expected. 20° Quite possibly, section
6002, designed to achieve effective law enforcement against organized
crime, may lead to precisely the opposite result. A witness may find no
incentive to talk where he can still be prosecuted and may prefer the
consequences of a contempt finding. Testimony in such a situation may
lead to animosity on the part of compatriots and an accompanying fear
on the part of the witness of adverse non-legal consequences. Without
the added incentive inherent in the removal of all criminal sanctions,
silence may indeed be golden.
E. R. Harding
197. In H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970), it was stated:The exception for perjury, false statements or other failure to comply with the
order is probably unnecessary .... It is included out of caution to insure that
such immunity is not given.
198. 361 F. Supp. 226, 228 (E.D. Pa.), ag'd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973) (mem.The witness Cahalane had previously made false statements on federal registration
certificates required in connection with the purchase of guns allegedly smuggled to
Northern Ireland. As he could be prosecuted for such statements under 18 U.S.C.§ 1001 (1970) (see note 185 supra), he claimed that the exceptive language of section6002 rendered the proposed immunity grant constitutionally deficient in not precluding
use of compelled testimony in a prosecution for that prior offense. 361 F. Supp. at 228.199. 361 F. Supp. at 228. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971).
200. See, e.g., Note, Immunity and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2 Am. J. CRIM.L. 29 (1973); Note, The Scope of Testimonial Immunity Under the Fifth Amend-
ment: Kastigar v. United States, 6 Loy. L.A.L. Rxv. 350 (1973); 48 WASH. L.
REv. 711 (1973).
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